As a result of the global financial crisis countercyclical capital requirements have been discussed to prevent financial bubbles generated in the banking sector and to mitigate the adverse effects of financial repression after a bubble burst. This paper analyses the effects of an endogenous capital requirement based on the credit-to-GDP gap along with other policy instruments. We develop a macroeconomic framework which endogenizes market expectations on asset values and allows for interbank transactions. We then show how a bubble in the banking sector relaxes financing constraints. In policy experiments we find that an endogenous capital requirement can effectively reduce the impact of a financial bubble. We show that central bank intervention ("leaning against the wind") instead has only a minor effect.
Introduction
Financial cycles are less frequent than average business cycles. However, when speculative financial bubbles burst, their economic consequences are rather persistent (Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) ; Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) ). A financial bubble consists of three phases: creation of the bubble (potentially triggered by financial innovation), period of inflation and sudden burst (or implosion). During the boom the price of an asset deviates from its intrinsic value, i.e. it is not just determined by supply and demand forces; such deviation features a positive feedback mechanism. In a burst the prices suddenly fall with negative feedback mechanism, sometimes below the intrinsic value. These interactions can amplify economic fluctuations and possibly lead to serious financial distress and prolonged economic disruption.
In this paper we formalize the processes of bubble creation and asset price inflation to provide a setting for the analysis of monetary policy and efficacy of regulatory instruments. In particular, we consider a real (or rational) trigger of the bubble (financial innovation) and an (irrational or behavioral) extrapolation of past loan growth into the future asset price. Hence, the size of loan portfolio is not just determined by supply and demand. The loan size is also linked to expectations of future loan value with a positive feedback mechanism in the bubble variable coming from the pricing at the loan trading stage.
The model comprises households who consume, work for firms and banks, and invest in bank shares: they face a deposit in advance constraint which introduces a spillover from the financial sector into the real economy. The commercial banking sector comprises a bank headquarter and retail branches which interact with households giving out differentiated loans to households. The "wholesale" unit is responsible for the management of the capital position of the bank. We allow for interbank transactions (securitization) in the loan market where resale of loans triggers the build up of the financial bubble. The repackaging of loans means a higher value as it allows for a mark-to-market of the price expectations through sale. This also results in a higher level of bank capital. As the amount of outstanding loans are linked to optimal bank capital, rising equity capital allows to expand further on the amount of loans. Finally, there is a monetary authority setting interest rates for bank refinancing.
We consider several policy options (i ) a conventional monetary policy reaction to changes in overall loans ("leaning against the wind"); (ii ) a macroprudential measure that increases exogenously the target level of the capital requirement for bank equity and (iii ) an endogenous capital requirement that reacts to the credit-to-GDP gap. We conclude that a "leaning against the wind" policy is not very effective in reducing the size of financial bubbles while endogenous macroprudential measures can target (pure) financial bubbles more effectively than interest rate policy. This result is also in line with the findings by Galì (2017) who shows that monetary policies that lean against the bubble are potentially destabilizing and likely to be dominated by inflation targeting policies.
The paper is organised as follows: The first section discusses the motivation and related literature. Section 2 to 6 describe the model. Section 7 shows quantitative experiments. Section 8 concludes.
Motivation
The run-up of financial bubbles followed by financial crashes is a (sadly) frequent phenomena in modern economies. The building up of the bubble as well as its crash usually sets a number of amplification mechanisms linked to the presence of financial frictions and spillovers effects in the real economy (especially in terms of consumption and investment decisions). "Procyclicality" is a relevant feature of the financial cycles for macroeconomists and policymaking: hence the focus on business cycle fluctuations and financial crises (Borio et al. Figure 1 shows various developments of the credit cycle (measured by credit-to-GDP gap 1 ) in Japan, the U.S. and Europe. Japan faced a very deep crisis in the early 1990s
caused by booming real estate and stock markets leading to the so-called "lost decade" of the 1990s and enduring low growth during the 2000s. To prick the bubble in real estate and in the stock market, the Bank of Japan implemented standard conventional policies by raising the official discount rate in May 1989, from 2.5% to 6.0%. In addition, the Bank of Japan forced the real estate sector to de-lever by reducing the amount of lending to the real estate sector where several real estate firms faced bankruptcy, leading to fire sales and a drop in real asset prices. Ultimately, the drop in real estate prices led to a decrease in the value of the collateral and to an overall lending decline with a debt overhang problem for the entire banking sector (see, for example, Hoshi and Kashyap (2004) ). Only in very recent years Japan moved from conventional to macroprundential policies aiming at increasing the minimum Tier1 ratio of capital over risky assets from 4.5% (2013) to 6% (2017). Policy switches to stricter capital requirements can also be observed in the U.S. and Europe. The coupling low interest rates and financial innovation in the form of mortgage securitization 2 had fueled the U.S. real estate prices bubble and the following burst in 2007
1 The BIS defines the credit-to-GDP gap as the difference between the credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-run trend. In the BIS database the credit-to-GDP ratio is total credit to the private nonfinancial sector and captures total borrowing from all domestic and foreign sources as input data (https://www.bis.org/statistics/c gaps.htm).
2 Alan Greenspan testifying at the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in 2010 explained, "Whether it was a glut of excess intended saving, or a shortfall of investment intentions, the result was the same: a fall in global real long-term interest rates and their associated capitalization rates. Asset prices, particularly house prices, in nearly two dozen countries accordingly moved dramatically higher. U.S. house price gains were More recently the European Union has been dealing with a major sovereign debt crisis which has been feeding into the financial sector. As also Borio (2012) notes fiscal policy intervention needs extra caution when economic booms and financial booms are coupled. The reason is that financial booms do not just enhance the balance sheets of financial institutions (Borio and Drehmann (2009)), they also enhance the fiscal accounts of public governments (Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2004) , BIS (2010, 2012), Borio (2011), Benetrix and Lane (2011)). As potential output tend to be overestimated the sovereign inadvertently accumulates contingent liabilities. Furthermore, government bonds typically appear as risk neutral assets especially in the balance sheet of financial intermediaries. As the bubble busts balance sheet problems appear, especially in the financial sector, because of the dual risk-exposure coming from private lending and government assets. The response to the financial crises both in the U.S., Japan and Europe has been a general increase in capital requirement as shown in Figure 2 
Related Literature
There is a growing literature on financial bubbles in macroeconomic models. Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) analyse the amplification mechanisms of rational bubbles. In models high by historical standards but no more than average compared to other countries." of rational bubbles, agents hold a bubble asset because its price is expected to rise in the future. The implied explosive nature of the price path in this class of models is consistent with the observed run-up phases to many financial crises.
Bubbles can emerge in an overlapping generation setting (Galí (2014) , (2017)). Furthermore, and in contrast with the earlier literature on rational bubbles, the introduction of nominal rigidities allow the Central Bank to impact on the real interest rate and, through it, on the magnitude of the bubble.
Bubbles can also arise and survive because of several class of frictions characterising the underlying economic model. A more recent strand of literature deals with these counterfactual implications by adding borrowing constraints. For example, in the model by Martin and Ventura (2012) , entrepreneurs face financing constraints so they can borrow only a fraction of their future firm value. When such financing constraints are present, bubbles can have a crowding-in effect, and thus allow the productive set of entrepreneurs to increase investments.
The control of bubble-burst episodes in the financial sector has triggered a series of proposals. Benes and Kumhof (2012) analyse in a DSGE setting the implication of the Chicago Plan. The key feature of this plan was the control of the credit functions in the banking system by ensuring that the creation of new bank credit can only take place through earnings that have been retained in the form of government-issued money, but not through the creation of new deposits by banks. The plan is preventing banks from creating excessive inside money during credit booms, and then dismantle it during economic downturns, in order to soften credit cycles.
More recent macroprudential policies try to influence the supply of credit taking a systemwide approach. In the absence of macroprudential policy the monetary authority reacts to an adverse change to financial conditions by using the policy rate to affect the refinancing conditions of financiale intermediaries (Blinder et al. (2008) , Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) ). In extreme situations, as when the Central Bank operates at the zero lower bound, interest rate policy may be complemented by unconventional tools (Bernanke and Reinhard (2004) Woodford (2012) and Svensson (2012) analyse the effectiveness of macroprudential policy along with an interest rate policy. While Woodford finds a complementary role of both, Svensson argues in favor of a clear assignment to financial stability and price stability, respectively. Most of macroprudential tools discussed in the literature are targeted at the bank's regulatory capital to address potential vulnerabilities on the demand side of credit.
Studies which raise the importance of supply side features identify, instead, short term debt refinancing of banks as a major source of vulnerability and financial innovation in the form of new financial instruments used in the interbank market. 4 Endogenous capital requirements (Borio (2012)) have been proposed as a part of macroprudential policies. A key element is to address the procyclicality of the financial sector by building up buffers in good times, when financial vulnerabilities emerge, so as to be able to drain them in bad times, when financial strain materialises. There are several ways of intervening in this direction, through the design of macroprudential tools. Basel III, for instance, has designed a countercyclical capital buffer as opposed to "leaning against the wind policy" and other forms of capital and liquidity standards.
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The approach in this paper is placed in the literature of general equilibrium models with supply side financial frictions. We consider a model with bank monitoring and inside money creation features as in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) with the added feature of interbank transactions, in the form of securitization in the loan market, where a resale of loans triggers the build up of the financial bubble. The repackaging of loans results in a higher value as it allows for marked-to-market of the bubble through sale. In a financial system where balance sheets are continuously marked-to-market, asset price changes show up immediately in changes in net worth, and elicit responses from financial intermediaries who adjust the size of their balance sheets. Hence marked-to-market leverage is strongly procyclical Shin, 2008 and as the loan bubble feeds into bank's equity values featuring a banking sector transmission through endogenous bank capital (see also Gerali et al., 2011) . In the proposed setup we analyse the stabilising effects of several policy options: (i ) a conventional monetary policy reaction to changes in overall loans ("leaning against the wind"); (ii ) a macroprudential measure that increases exogenously the target level of the capital requirement for bank equity and (iii ) an endogenous capital requirement that reacts to the credit-to-GDP gap.
which together form the production sector. The commercial banks feature a bank headquarter and retail branches which lend to households. We allow for interbank transactions in form of trades of securitized loan portfolios. We model productivity, i.e. efficiency in loan production, and lending constraints in form of equity capital in the financial sector. A relaxation of financial constraints by looser regulation often stand at the beginning of credit booms (e.g. the Japan bubble, U.S. subprime boom, lending booms in some Eurozone countries). Furthermore, new technologies in loan production (IT) and selling (e.g. securitization) allow for an expansion of loans. Finally, the model includes a monetary authority which sets the riskless interest rate.
Households
There is a mass one of infinitely-lived households with the utility described by
where c t is consumption, l s t labor provided to the production sector and m s t labor provided to the banking sector. Q Ψ t represents the equity price and Ψ t the equity investments. φ l reflects the weight of leisure and φ e the weight of stock investments in utility. Households only can acquire consumption goods by spending bank deposits D t which means that they have to fulfill a money in advance constraint given by
Their budget is described by the following inequality which involves the interest payments on loans, L t , and deposits, D t :
...
Here B t are savings in government bonds, w t the real wage for production or banking labor, P t the price level, and R 
Firms
Production of consumer goods involves two stages with intermediate inputs. The final goods firm produces a composite good, y t , by combining intermediate goods, y t (i), through a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator, i.e.
The profit function of intermediate firm i is given by
Intermediate goods are produced by employing labor l t according to the following technology
There is a probability of θ that firms are not able to change the price in a given period. Thus firms setting the price have to solve the following multi-period problem (Calvo (1983) pricing), i.e.
with P * t being the optimal price set in period t.
Banking Sector
The financial sector comprises of commercial banks which are active in the traditional banking business, i.e. handing out credit to households, and which are able to trade loan portfolios with each other. Thus the bank business involves a loan origination and trading stage. 
Loan origination
There is a mass 1 of commercial banks with a bank headquarter and retail branches.
Bank headquarter
The bank headquarter decides on the interest rate spread given the optimal amount of loans and the capital structure. The bank headquarter maximizes its profit function,
where L t is the overall loan portfolio, and D t are the total household bank deposits and e t bank equity. Banks face a quadratic cost related to a deviation from the optimal ratio of bank equity versus the loan portfolio, the capital requirement ratio τ . At the headquarter level the individual bank balance sheet constraint has to hold, i.e.
Bank headquarters also decide on the amount of monitoring work which is remunerated by the real wage, w t . It is implied by the size of the loan portfolio through following loan management technology
with Q t being the efficiency in loan production, which can be subject to shocks following a AR(1) process
Optimal loan provision gives the external finance premium on the bank headquarter level, i.e.
Retail banks
Retail banks hand out differentiated loans to households (following the mechanisms a la Gerali et al. (2011)). Deposit demand for transaction purposes triggers demand for loans. Total loan demand, L t , and total deposit demand, D t , are derived from the money in advance condition. 6 The differentiated loan demand function by households reads as
6 Deposit demand equivalently reads as
for all j retail banks with L being the elasticity of substitution between loans from different retail branches. This results in an effective loan rate of
where
represents the loan markup.
Profit, Dividends and Retained earnings
Bank profits, ω B,t , are given by the in-period return over equity and monitoring costs, i.e.
The share of profits, φ Ψ , which is paid out as dividends is given by
The remaining share, (1 − φ Ψ ), is booked as a profit to the bank's equity capital e t . The law of motion for bank capital, e t , is then
where Ψ is the initial stock of bank equity and φ B is the pass-through of equity price changes to bank capital. Stock price changes (Q 
Loan securitization and trading
Banks are allowed to securitize loans into tradable loan portfolios, and exchange them with each other with their given value plus a profit.
Initial financial innovation shock. We assume a financial innovation shock which is a productivity shock to the efficiency of the bank loan production function, Q t , by which the size and thus the value of the loan, L t , increases at banks. We can think of the productivity shock to the efficiency in loan production, Q t , as a new technology shock which allows to increase the loan output while reducing the monitoring need of banks. The mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 3 which shows the loan demand and loan supply, and the interest rate at which the market clears. A higher efficiency in loan production allows for an outward shift Figure 3 : Shock to loan production efficiency
in the loan supply curve.
Bubble creation through resale technology. When banks sell a loan portfolio through Figure 4 : Expansion of equity capital due to mark-to-market
securitization they realize gains of expected future valuation changes, i.e.
withẼ t the expectation operator with an adaptive expectation formation. The expectation formation about future prices depends on past changes in the value of the loan portfolio, so we have
Thus the size of the bubble is determined by extrapolating the pace of loan growth which makes it backward looking. Using this condition and plugging into the loan production function of above results iñ
Transmission to bank equity. The repackaging of loans results in a higher value, with the bubble term, b t , being the profit of this transaction. The repackaging technology allows for a mark-to-market of the bubble through sale. This results in a higher level of bank equity by the bubble size, i.e. e t + b t . This is illustrated in Fig. 4 . As the amount of loans outstanding is linked to optimal bank capital, rising equity capital allows the bank headquarter to expand further on the total amount of loans, L t , i.e.
We can separate two cases: First, if equity capital, e t , is scarce, then the increase in equity capital leads to an expansion of loans in the next period, L t+1 , as the constraint is relaxed and banks can service more credit demand. Alternatively, if equity capital is abundant loans, L t+1 , will also expand as banks are able to lower the credit spread along with lower capital costs. Through this effect we see a spill-over to demand which shifts outwards and absorbs the higher lending capacity of banks. This mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 5 .
Discussion: From the standard model to the bubble model
We incorporate two main features which characterize a bubble into a DSGE model with banks: First, the size of loan portfolio is not just determined by supply and demand in the loan market. Instead of just matching consumption through the money in advance condition, the loan size is also linked to expectations of future loan value, which allows for a bubble component in pricing. Second, there is a (positive) feedback mechanism in the bubble variable coming from the pricing at the loan trading stage. This feedback mechanism leads to an excessive growth of loans over GDP while the bubble is growing. This additional loan supply through the banking sector keeps consumption higher than given by what a household could fundamentally afford through its consumption-savings decision.
Monetary policy
The policy rate follows a Taylor (1993) rule which reacts to inflation, π t , and fluctuations in output, y t , i.e.
with A3 t following a AR(1) process. We modify the Taylor rule for further experimentation in the quantitative section.
Quantitative Results and Policy Experiments
We solve the model for its equilibrium, calculate non-stochastic steady states and linearize the model around the steady state. In the following we describe the benchmark calibration for the simulation of the model, before we show impulse responses for a financial bubble shock. Finally, we employ the simulated model for several policy experiments.
Benchmark Calibration
The model is calibrated to quarterly frequencies matching endogenous aggregates and interest rates to observable data. We assume zero average inflation. The household discount factor is set to 0.99 implying an annual real rate of interest of 4% for the riskless bond rate R B .
The share of intermediate firms which cannot reset their price in a given period is θ = 0.77. The Dixit-Stiglitz parameter, , is set to 6 generating a mark-up of 20%. The velocity of money v is set to 0.31 on the basis of average GDP to M3 after the U.S. subprime crisis. The capital requirement ratio τ is set to 11%. For further experimentation we change τ to 15%. We assume a coefficient equal to 0.34 for the concavity of labour in the the production function of the intermediate product; for loan management we choose a coefficient of equal to 0.65. We set total labor supplied in steady state to 1/2 of hours, similar to Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) . The share of working time devoted to banking services is 2%. This implies that a share of 49% of total time is in the production sector and 1% in the banking sector. Following Gerali et al. (2011) we calibrate the banking parameters to replicate data averages for commercial bank interest rates and spreads. We calibrate the steady states to R B = 4% p.a. and R IB = 3.36% p.a. This implies an annualised return for R D = 2.6% p.a. and a loan rate R L = 6.7% p.a. From the derivation of the implied steady states of the model we have that 76% of profits are paid as dividends assuming that equity depreciates at 10% p.a.. The technology shocks are assumed to be quite persistent, with a standard deviation equal to 0.72% and an autoregressive parameter 0.95. The shock to the policy rate has a standard deviation equal to 0.82%, and an autoregressive parameter of 0.9, and for the financial innovation shock we assume a higher standard deviation of 1% and an autoregressive parameter equal to 0.9. Shocks to the TFP have a relatively prolonged effect on macroeconomic variables, while a monetary policy shock rapidly dies out and the economy reaches again the steady state. The bubble shock is modeled as being somewhat persistent due to its effects on loan creation. Monetary policy coefficients on inflation and the output are 1.5 and 0.5. The rest of the parameters, implied steady states and interest rates used in the calibration are given in Tables 1-3 . financial innovation 1% Figure 6 : Impulse responses to a financial bubble shock
Note: All interest rates are shown as absolute deviations from the steady state, expressed in percentage points. All other variables are percentage points deviations from the implied steady state value.
Impulse response for the Financial Bubble
We first show the impulse response to a financial innovation shock in Fig. 6 and then the impulse under a variation of price persistence. The financial innovation shock leads to a reduction in monitoring needs to service given transaction money demand. Simultaneously, the bank spread (external finance premium, or EFP) and the equity price are lowered. The amount of loans handed out by banks rise on impact. Then they further increase due to the positive feedback mechanism of the financial bubble. The financial bubble has a direct impact on inflation and due to staggered pricing also real effects on consumption in addition to the initial financial innovation shock.
We illustrate the effect of the staggered pricing mechanism (as in Calvo (1983) ) under the financial bubble shock (Fig. 7) . We find that with higher price persistence less adjustment is channeled through inflation and real effects are higher. Hence, the effects of a financial bubble differ for economies depending on the degree of price flexibility. In particular, the assumption of sticky prices makes monetary policy non-neutral, allowing it to influence the size of the bubble; on the other hand, price stickiness makes it possible for aggregate bubble fluctuations to influence aggregate demand and, hence, output and employment. 
Policy experiments
We test how effective several monetary and macroprudential policies are in this setup:
In Fig. 8 we study the effect of monetary policy reacting to changes in overall loans, L t . This would modify the Taylor rule of the monetary authority towards
We see in the impulse response that the modified Taylor rule has little effect on inflation and consumption although the policy reaction doubles. A reaction to overall loan growth barely affects bank leverage, the credit margin (EFP) or the equity price. We conclude that a "leaning against the wind" policy is not effective in reducing the size of financial bubbles. The next experiment uses a macroprudential measure by increasing the target level of the capital requirement ratio, τ , from a level of 11% towards 15%.
The increased capital requirement ratio leads to a reduction of the impact of the shock as demonstrated in Fig. 9 . The response of inflation and consumption is dampened. This works through the equity price which is lowered during a financial shock (almost twice as much compared to the base case). On the other hand, the negative impact on the spread between the loan and deposit rate is reduced, meaning that the financial sector can better absorb the bubble shock. Finally, in Fig. 10 we introduce an endogenous capital requirement, τ t , set by regulator along the following rule reacting to the credit-to-GDP gap:
Under the rule reacting to the credit-to-GDP gap we see a reaction of the financial bubble compared to the base case. While the equity price falls more than in the base case (but less than under the exogenous increase in target capital), the reaction of the spread (external finance premium, EFP) is much lower. The stabilization comes from the combination of a lower equity price and a smaller response of deposits and loans. The side effects of the financial bubble are reduced, inflation and consumption react significantly less. The visible impact on the target variables inflation and consumption while at the same time other variables do not move let us conclude that an endogenous requirement is effective in precisely working in the required way without adversely affecting other macroeconomic variables. Supporting this reasoning, Table 4 shows that under and endogenous macroprudential rule the volatility of consumption and loans is sensibly attenuated while the volatility of equity and equity prices increases. 
Conclusions
In this paper we set up a framework for the causes and effects of a financial bubble. With this model we shed light on recent policy debates on monetary and macroprudential instruments. The financial bubble features the deviation of the value of an asset from its equilibrium value determined by supply and demand, as well as a positive feedback mechanism for the value deviation. The analytical framework shows how a financial bubble can develop from the bank supply side with households following standard behavioral functions. We demonstrate how a bubble in the banking sector relaxes financing constraints on the liability side as it increases the value on the asset side of bank balance sheets. Through higher bank lending, the financial bubble generates (temporary) income effects at the side of the households.
We test several measures on whether they can effectively reduce the impact of a financial bubble. We find that a macroprudential rule which reacts to the credit-to-GDP gap proves to be the most effective measure to prevent a bubble from growing. A central bank intervention against the financial bubble ("leaning against the wind") has only a minor effect. We thereby provide a rationale for the use of counter-cyclical capital buffers.
A Linearised model
Let x denote the deviation of a variable x from its steady state. The model can then be reduced to the following linearised system of equations: 1) Supply of production and monitoring labor
2) Demand for production labor
3) Monitoring demand
4) Production
5) Supply of banking services
6) Money in advance constraint
7) Inflation
8) Calvo (1983) pricing π t = βE t π t+1 + ϑ mc t (34) with ϑ = 
14) Bond rate
15) Equity price
17) Deposit rate
18) Policy feedback rule
19) Bank Profit 
There are 21 equations and 21 variables.
B Calculating Steady States
There is no technological progress A1 t = A1 = 1 and no price change i.e. P t = P = 1. 
